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CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY
ROBERT A. FEAREY
The subject matter of this article is outside the author's professional field. We have
here, therefore, one layman's views on the philosophy of punishment, and there are
challenging elements in it.
Mr. Fearey is an officer of the United States Department of State. From 1941
through 1951, in Washington and Tokyo, he was assigned to Japanese questions. He
is now a member of the U. S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
His book, "The Occupation of Japan" was published by Macmillan in 1950.--EDrroR.
CHARACTER A PASSIVE CREATION?
The careers of two young hoodlums-the nth children of poor families-had
followed a familiar pattern: early transgressions, the reformatory, increasingly
serious crimes, classification as "habitual type criminals", and finally murder during
a holdup. In his concluding argument the prosecuting attorney maintained that the
young men had faced regrettable handicaps in their upbringing for which they could
not be held responsible; that this mitigating factor did not, however, detract from
their essential responsibility for their acts as sane, adult individuals; and that not
simply for the protection of society but as deserved retribution for a vicious crime
they should pay the supreme penalty.
The day may come when this reasoning will be seriously questioned. Gradually, so
gradually as almost to have escaped detection by most of us, the social sciences have
narrowed the area in which the individual can reasonably be considered responsible
for his acts. We sometimes forget that it is only in comparatively recent times that
the irresponsibility of the insane has been recognized. Increasingly in dealing with
youthful transgressors, the courts, prompted by the scientific spirit of the age, have
sought to correct and reform rather than to punish those not yet at the "age of
reason". And steadily growing recognition has been accorded the influence of
environment and heredity in the formation of character-factors beyond the individ-
ual's control and for which he therefore cannot logically be held responsible.
Increased knowledge of the extent to which we are the passive creations of factors
over which we have no control has not as yet in any degree, however, shaken the
universal conviction that the sane, adult individual is nevertheless essentially a self-
determining entity responsible for his acts and deserving of reward or punishment,
ultimately in a hereafter if not on earth, according to the nature of those acts. A
murderer can be born of parents with criminal tendencies, be of subnormal mentality,
and be brought up from infancy to a life of crime, but if he is of age and adjudged
"legally sane" he will be held fully responsible for his crime and made to suffer the
mental and physical torture of execution. The concept of man as a self-determining,
responsible agent is as old as the human race, and basic to much of our legal and
religious thinking. For obvious reasons, therefore, our minds seem unconsciously to be
in revolt against the thought that we may be not just partly but wholly the product
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of factors over which we have no control and that our idea of ourselves as self-
determining, responsible entities is only a self-satisfying illusion. Nevertheless, the
evidence to that effect seems clear.
The "character" of a child at an age of obvious irresponsibility, from infancy up to,
say, two years, can at most have been derived from three sources. The child in-
herited certain characteristics from its parents, and through them from its grand-
parents and still farther back on the family trees. Environmental influences had
been acting on it from conception. And it may or may not, depending on one's
individual beliefs, have had a soul placed within it by a Creator, i.e., some element
which it did not inherit from its forebears or obtain as a result of environmental
influences but which forms part of its make-up and latent character. Common to all
three of these elements is the fact that the child manifestly had no part in their
selection, any more than it did in regard to its being born at all. Being completely
passive to the selection process, and with its "character" so dearly limited to these
three possible components, a child of this age is everywhere recognized not to be
responsible for its actions.
As the child grows we find the average mother beginning to impute an independent
and responsible personality to it and to held it at least partially culpable for its
misdeeds. Reprimands and physical punishment begin to include a note of blame.
Reward and punishment are no longer administered purely for their educative value
but are regarded as at least partly deserved by the child, which is now considered
to be beginning to determine its own behavior and hence to be at least partly respon-
sible for that behavior.
The mother's change of attitude is understandable, but would seem to have no
logical basis. Only if the child, in passing from an irresponsible to a supposed re-
sponsible age, had somehow been able to free itself from" the control of its existing,
passively acquired "character" and, stepping outside itself, select and introduce into
its make-up new elements not in accordance with its character,. would we be justified
in considering that it had become responsible, i.e., come to deserve blame or praise,
punishment or reward for its actions. Having independently of its existing, passively
derived character introduced new elements into its make-up, it would necessarily
become responsible for actions which it might later take as a result of those elements.
Needless to say, however, there is no evidence that children, in reaching an age when
their parents begin to consider them responsible individuals, take any such action,
or that their characters at this age are any more than the rational development of
their former irresponsible characters, as the result of increasing age and widening
and changing environmental influences. It would be impossible for a child or anyone
else to put aside his existing nature and add elements to his makeup not in accordance
with his existing nature.
By the time the child reaches fourteen or sixteen the impression of an independentl"
self-determlning, responsible person is almost overpowering. When a boy of this age
steals, the parents are likely to ascribe part of the blame to undesirable neighborhood
associates, and a court will emphasize correction rather than punishment until the
age of reason or full responsibility is reached. But both parents and court are likely
to place a major share of blame on the boy himself, irrespective of the qualities he
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must be assumed to have inherited, his environment, and his soul. The boy himself
will probably feel that the decision to commit the misdeed was personally and
independently his. Reason indicates, however, that all decisions and consequent
actions of a boy of sixteen are dictated by his character reacting to contemporary
circumstances and influences; that he possesses no powers of decision or action inde-
pendent of his character; and that he is not responsible for the nature of his character
because at any given time it is the ciimulative product of the fact that he was born
at all, inherited characteristics, environmental influences, perhaps a soul-for none
of which is he responsible-and a long series of actions since early childhood for which,
since they were always dictated by and in accordance with a character for which he
was not responsible, he cannot be held responsible.
The underlying cause of warped character and consequent bad behavior in a boy
of this age is of course not always readily apparent from his background. The more
obscure the cause the more inclined the parents and judge are to blame the boy
"himself". Imagine, for example, a boy born of respectable, well-to-do parents
brought up intelligently in a good neighborhood. Nevertheless at the age of twelve
he begins to show a disobedient and recalcitrant streak, runs away frequently, shows
a preference for bad over good associates and finally ends up in court in his sixteenth
year charged with repeated serious offenses. In sending him to a reformatory the judge
would be likely to develop the point that although in cases of underprivileged boys
from poor environments he usually felt more inclined to pity than to blame, in this
case, where the boy had had every advantage but had chosen to repudiate his good
upbringing and training, he felt he fully deserved the punishment he was getting.
This attitude seems logically indefensible. There seems to be no justification simply
because the cause of the boy's misdoing is not easily perceived in his background for
jumping to the conclusion that the cause is not in his background, i.e., in relatively
obscure inherited or environmental influencesi to which he was as passive as a less
advantaged contemporary to the influences bearing on him. If more were known of
heredity, and of the character components'which may be placed in every one of us at
birth by a Creator, the boy's misdeeds would be as apparent in his background as in
other more obvious cases.
The actions of John Doe, aged 40, give every appearance of being taken by an
independently self-determining person in whom such factors as inherited characteris-
tics and environmental influences have been completely submerged and overshadowed
by the character of John Doe "himself". And yet reason indicates that the character
of an adult is as completely the product of external factors over which he has had no
control as the character of a boy of sixteen. Each stage of life derives from the pre-
vious stage, going back to an early childhood of obvious irresponsibility. No decision
that John Doe has made during his entire lifetime (for example at the age of 22 to
go to law school and make a career for himself instead of living off a legacy just left
him by a rich uncle) comdM have been made differently from the way it was, given his
character at the moment of the decision, a character for the nature of which he was
not responsible, and the contemporary external situation, e.g., the promptings of
parents and friends, an opening in the law school of his choice, the likelihood that
taxes on unearned income would be increased, etc. Being what he was and the
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circumstances what they were his creditable decision followed inevitably, and cannot
logically be said to entitle him to praise or blame, reward or punishment.
If we are willing to face the fact, offensive as it may appear, there is no more logical
justification for ascribing responsibility to an adult man or woman than to a ten-year
old car. As a car does not choose to be made, so a human being does not choose to be
born. Once that decision has been made for him he has no more power to choose his
inherited characteristics than a car has to choose its motor or body characteristics.
Man no more chooses his early environmental influences than a car does the nature
of the country in which it is driven during its early years or the care given it by its
first owner. And man is no more responsible in later years for his c1aracter, developing
step by step from these early influences and in accordance with changing external
circumstances, than a car in its later years is responsible for its performance, derived
from the characteristics instilled in it by its manufacturer and the treatment accorded
it by its various owners. And yet while no man in his right mind would think of
blaming a ten-year old car for bad performance, an adult criminal is everywhere
considered responsible for his crimes, with only a partial bow toward the inherited
environmental and other passively acquired characteristics which, together with a
possible soul, in fact entirely account for his waywardness. Man's variegated character
and wide capacities have blinded us to the fact that he is in fact as passive to his
creation and development, and hence as unaccountable for his actions, as an inani-
mate machine.
Ty WE AssU= A SoUL
Of the three sources of character-inherited attributes, environmental influences
and, possibly, a soul-the relation of the last to the problem of individual responsi-
bility is the most difficult to analyze because, while we may believe much, we know
nothing about the possible existence and composition of the soul. The fact that so
many persons' characters are so different from what even the most exhaustive re-
search into their inherited attributes and environmental backgrounds woud lead one
to expect supports the idea that the individual's make-up does include a third element
received from some unknown source. Thus far we have confined our treatment of the
soul to what would seem the indisputable statement that if the individual possesses
a soul he did not select it himself, and therefore, as with inherited characteristics
and environmental influences, he cannot logically be held responsible for its nature,
or for actions to which he may be led as a consequence of its nature. The concept
herein developed of man as the passive product of factors over which he has exerted
no independent, self-determined control is left unimpaired by this interpretation of
the soul.
Some, however, have a view of the soul which would for them constitute a com-
plete refutation of the suggestion that man cannot logically be considered to deserve
blame or praise, reward or punishment for his actions. To such persons the soul is the
seat and source of human responsibility. Through the soul, given each of us by the
Creator, sometimes represented even as a piece of the Creator, we are held each of us
to have been originally constructed, and to remain, responsible, self-determining
individuals. The fact that one does hot choose his soul makes no difference. He has
it and by its possession is ipso facto a responsible being.
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This view, that we are created responsible in the same way that we are created
with two arms and two legs, cannot be disproved. But neither is there the slightest
evidence to support it. On the contrary, man's nature, activity and entire course of
existence can all be completely explained and accounted for on the basis of the
directly opposite thesis, that we are not created responsible but that each of us is
the passive product of factors over which we had no control,-including, possibly, a
soul in the limited sense of a portion of our make-ups not derived from inheritance
or environment but instilled'in us at birth or later. Why should the soul, if we each
have a soul of any kind, be of such particular type as to make us responsible? There
is no reason, though it is easy to see why man with his limited knowledge of the
effects of heredity and environment should have from earliest times accepted the
apparent fact that, from the possession of a soul or simply from the way he was
made, he was his own master, self-determining and hence responsible. When one
analysis-leading to the conclusion that man, like a Ford car, is the product of
factors over which he has had no control-accords in every respect with experience
and objective fact, is it reasonable to reject that analysis in favor of another which
rests only on belief, even if the belief of untold generations, and which involves us in
practices which appear patently wrong and misconceived, such as our penological
practices?
No REsPONsIBrmY? THMN WHAT?
What would a world be like from which the concept of individual responsibility
had been eliminated? Would it be a better or a worse place in which to live?
Clearly worse if everyone acted "irresponsibly", indulging his every desire on the
theory that since he was recognized not to be responsible for his actions he might as
well do as he pleased. It seems unlikely, however, that people would act this way.
The on-balance good behavior of the majority of men is not due to desire for praise
and reward or to fear of blame and punishment but to the discovery over the course
of human history that "proper" living, in a cooperative rather than a selfish relation-
ship to one's fellow men, is most conducive to happiness. This fundamental fact, and
the incentive to proper living which it provides, would remain. Success in the various
walks of life would be recognized to be the result of factors for which the individual
could claim no credit, but there is no reason to believe that this would mean a diminu-
tion of incentive to success through constructive endeavor. The principal incentives
to achievement-to secure the necessities and the luxuries of life for oneself and
one's family, to attain a position of authority and respect in the community, and to
promote the public welfare-would remain.
Is there danger that human relationships would be devitalized if everyone's
character and personality were recognized to be the product of factors over which he
had had no control and was not responsible? The risk seems slight. One likes or
dislikes others because of what they are. How they came to be what they are varies
from a matter of secondary importance to one of virtual unimportance. The present
writer, who has been convinced of the fallacy of our concepts of blame and praise,
punishment and reward throughout his adult life, has not found his attitude toward
others affected in the slightest by this conviction. Nor, as far as he is aware, has his
general behavior been affected. This may be because one's attitudes and actions are
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never more than partially governed by one's logical beliefs. It may be impossible in
one lifetime to cease adherence, not simply in mind but also in practice, to a concept
so ingrained in human thought as to have become almost instinctive.
What would be the impact on religion? The belief that it is within each individual's
independent power of decision to lead a good or a bad life, and that the good will
be duly rewarded and the bad punished in an afterlife, forms an integral part not
only of the Christian, but, in various forms, of other leading religious faiths. Abandon-
ment of the concept of personal responsibility, and also, as would necessarily follow,
of the idea of the compensatory afterlife, would necessitate a thorough revision of
important religious doctrine, something which, needless to say, is scarcely to be
anticipated in the foreseeable future.
Viewing the matter only in the briefest and most preliminary way it seems probable,
however, that it would be more dogma than the ethical substance of sincere religious
beliefs which would be affected. The worthwhile Christian, for example, does not lead
a good life on earth in order to assure himself of heavenly reward, or because he fears
later punishment for earthly failings. He does so because he is convinced that right
conduct makes for a better and happier world. The theologian speaks frequently of
later reward or punishment, but the substance of his message is, or should be, the
happiness and peace of mind which a life of unselfish and constructive endeavor
brings here on earth. The proffer of heavenly reward or punishment seems neither
a very worthy nor, in practice, a particularly effective inducement to good conduct,
and it would seem could be dispensed with without in any way invalidating the
essential truths of Christian teaching. As to the comfort which the good derive from
comtemplation of a rewarding, or at least a peaceful, afterlife, this comfort need not
be lessened by knowledge that the good cannot logically take credit for having been
good nor the bad blamed for having been bad, and that all are therefore equally
deserving of a peaceful afterlife-if death should in fact be a gateway to further'life
rather than extinction. There seems, in short, no basis for believing that conduct,
which after all is or should be the basic concern of religion, would suffer if the con-
cepts of personal responsibility and the compensatory afterlife were abandoned.
WAY TO A REASONABLE PENOLOGY
Whatever its other effects, good or bad, recognition that blame and praise, punish-
ment and reward have no basis in reason would open the way to a much needed
reform of our present penal system.
That there is something basically wrong with our penal concepts is becoming
increasingly obvious. Each year vast amounts of the taxpayer's money are spent
in catching and convicting criminals. Sentences, however, are in accordance with
the seriousness of the crime; whether the crime was a temporary aberration not
likely to be repeated or the work of a confirmed criminal almost certain to be repeated
is a definitely secondary consideration. During confinement efforts for reform are
frequently negligible to nonexistent, while the influence of prison associations and
discipline is all in the direction of confirming the first offender in a life of crime.
Eligibility for parole is primarily on the basis of good behavior, which can be prac-
ticed as successfully by the confirmed criminal as by the novice. As the inevitable
result of these failings large numbers of criminals who have finished their terms or
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been paroled but are completely unregenerate are each year sent forth to resume
their careers of pillage and murder until once again apprehended, convicted and
returned to jail.
The cause of this dismal cycle seems dearly to be that our penal system, as the
name implies, is essentially dedicated to the negative purpose of punishment-to
compel the criminal to "pay his debt to society". It is, of course, not surprising that
this should be so. From time immemorial the antidote to crime has been punishment,
conceived as serving the double function of inflicting deserved retribution on the
evil-doer and of deterring others. While a certain amount of progress in the reform
of our penal system might be made, and indeed in some states, notably California,
is being made, within the framework of the universal concept that the individual is a
self-determining entity who is responsible for his acts and should be punished for
wrongdoing, there seems little doubt that widespread reform can only follow accept-
ance of the thesis, herein discussed, that the individual cannot logically be held re-
sponsible for his acts and does not deserve reward or punishment.
What would be the nature of such a reform? The objectives would be, first, to
eliminate the concept of deserved retribution in criminal sentences, and second, by
keeping the criminal in confinement for as long as he remains a public danger, while
making every effort to accomplish his permanent reform, to afford society a higher
degree of protection from its criminal element than it now receives. The criminal
would still go to jail but conditions of confinement would reflect the fact that he was
being held not in punishment, which would form no part of his treatment, but, like a
patient in an enlightened mental institution, solely to ensure that he did not consti-
tute a public danger. and in order to facilitate his reform. His "sentence" would not
be for a specified period of time but for as long as he was considered by competent
examiners, repeating their examinations at frequent intervals, to be a public danger.
The examiners, professional psychologists and criminologists, would base their
decisions on such factors as the premeditated or unpremeditated nature of the crime,
the criminal's previous history examined in greatest detail back to earliest childhood
and including hereditary influences, and his behavior while in confinement. A con-
victed murderer whom the examiners believed practically certain not to repeat his
crime might be held in confinement a relatively brief period, while a confirmed thief,
forger or other less serious but persistent offender might be detained indefinitely.
Capital punishment would be abolished. It would be the duty of the state, foreign
as the idea may sound in our present state of beliefs, to confine under as comfortable
conditions as practicable the most brutal murderer for his entire lifetime, if con-
tinual observation and frequent examinations indicated that he still would be a
public danger if released.'
Would this scheme--under which a life of confinement under reasonably com-
fortable conditions would be the worst any criminal need fear-remove the deterrent
to crime which our present, in some respects harsher, penal system is considered to
provide, and result in an increased crime rate?
I Readers familiar with the indeterminate sentence plans of California and certain other states
will note similarities to those plans. The differences between them and that here suggested derive




Though the deterrent effect of the proposed scheme might be less than that of
the present system, it is not certain. Criminals now know that they will be released
after completion of their set terms (probably before if their behavior is good) ir-
respective of whether they appear likely to return to crime or not. Under. the plan
here proposed, however, the "prospective" criminal would know that there was no
possibility of his release until expert examiners had agreed that the chances of his
committing a further crime were remote. Confirmed criminals, particularly, would
thus face the probability of longer confinements than now-not an attractive prospect
or without its deterrent value no matter what the conditions of confinement.
Even if the proposed scheme should constitute less of a deterrent to crime than
the present system, there is reason to believe that it would bring a substantial reduc:
tion in the total incidence of crime. This would follow primarily from the fact that
our absurd practice of releasing thousands of confirmed criminals each year would
be at an end. Further, the fact that the emphasis would be entirely on correction and
reform, and not at all on punishment or the simple completion of terms, should in-
crease the percentage of reforms. With release possible only on the decision of experts
that a reversion to crime was highly unlikely, the state would have a powerful incen-
tive from a financial point of view to accomplish the reform of criminals in its care.
And public knowledge that convicts were released only on expert testimony that
they had reformed would assist ex-convicts to rehabilitate themselves and to avoid
slipping back into crime.
It is not suggested that the scheme would be without its weaknesses. The examining
experts' task would be a difficult one even with our growing psychiatric, criminological
and other knowledge. But though mistakes would be made the improvement over a
system which deliberately looses upon society large numbers of known, confirmed
criminals each year seems obvious. Ranking beside this gain would be the fact that
the injustice now being done our criminal minority would be ended: a minority who
are being blamed and punished for actions for which their backgrounds and pure
chance were responsible, not "they themselves" in any independent, self-determining
sense.
CONCLUSION
The idea of personal accountability, which is very deeply imbedded in everyday
thinking and practice, is likely at most to be only very gradually modified. The
belief that his character is essentially his own creation is naturally one of man's most
attractive and self-satisfying concepts. Realization that he is not a self-determining
entity but merely the product of factors over which he has no control would be
a most disillusioning experience for the average member of the human race.
The fact that the idea of personal responsibility will almost certainly not be aban-
doned in the foreseeable future need not, in most respects, be a cause for concern.
The question whether the concept of personal responsibility will eventually be aban-
doned is, however, of definite importance for the sorely needed reform of our penal
system. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that, if emotional recognition of the irre-
sponsibility of man cannot soon be expected, a degree of intellectual recognition may
be attained in the not too distant future which will open the way to a satisfactory
reform of our penal concepts.
[Vol. 45
